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cases in general, the effect could be far-reaching. Although the court did
not prescribe the coverage that an insurance company must offer,5" it did
require that the policy which the insurance company later delivered "be
reasonably fit for its intended purpose"." The written terms must not be
unreasonable or unfair, and they must provide the protection that the insured
bargained for when he purchased the insurance."'
The court insisted upon full disclosure of any limitations on coverage."
Disclosure was seen as beneficial in that "technical policy provisions which
tend to drain away bargained-for protection" 3 would be eliminated. And if
a purchaser deliberately elected limited protection for a lower premium, at
least he would be fully aware of what coverage he was receiving.6 '
In a society which has become increasingly complex, we have felt a
need for Truth in Lending, Truth in Advertising, and labels that clearly
identify the components of our food and clothing. If the C & J Fertilizer
holding is followed, we will have Truth in Insurance as well.
JANICE Gui
TORTS
Automobile Guest Statute • Unconstitutional • Equal Protection
- Due Process .Right to Seek Legal Redress
Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975)
N JULY 1975, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Primes v. Tyler'
joined a small but growing number of states' which have declared automo-
bile guest statutes' unconstitutional. The circumstances of the Primes case are
similar to those encountered in countless other suits brought by injured
59 Such a requirement, which would set forth general standards, would be more akin to the
warranty of merchantability under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
60 227 N.W.2d at 177. Probably the warranty of fitness for particular purpose was selected
because the insurance purchaser relies on the agent to provide a policy which corresponds to
the needs which the purchaser has communicated. See UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-315,
Comments I & 2.
61 227 N.W.2d at 178.
62 Id. at 179.
63 Id.
64 Id.
1 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
2 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Thompson v.
Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974);
Johnson v. Hassett 217 N.W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974).
a Ohio's statute is typical of those of states which have guest statutes. OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4515.02 (Page 1973). Guest statutes have frequently been criticized for the harsh conse-
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1
Conrneille: Primes v. Tyler
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
guest passengers since the Ohio guest statute was enacted in 1933.' George
Primes, III and Donald G. Tyler were members of an informal golf group
which shared a car pool arrangement. Tyler, driving for the car pool, was
involved in an automobile accident in which Primes, a passenger, was injured.
Primes brought suit against Tyler demanding recovery for personal injuries
incurred in the accident on the basis of ordinary negligence on the part of
Tyler. Since both parties were part of a car pool, Primes asserted that he was
a paying passenger and thereby excepted from the guest statute preclusion
from maintaining suit on the basis of ordinary negligence. The trial court,
nevertheless, determined that Primes was not a paying passenger and directed
a verdict for Tyler.
On appeal, the Summit County Court of Appeals5 agreed that Primes
was not a paying passenger, but reversed the trial court decision on the basis
that the guest statute was unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that the
guest statute violated Primes' right to equal protection as guaranteed by
Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.6
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision,
holding that the guest statute, by its grant of a "special privilege and immunity
to negligent drivers who injure nonpaying passengers",7 was violative of equal
protection guarantees of both the Ohio Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to United States Constitution. The higher court further held that
because the guest statute "closes the courts and denies a remedy"' to some of
the people of Ohio, the statute was also violative of the due process guaran-
quences which they produce in denying automobile guests a remedy for negligently inflicted
injuries. See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Ohio Guest Statute, 8 AKRON L. REV.
135 (1974); Comment, The Ohio Guest Statutes Always Unpopular; Now Unconstitutional?
1 Omo NORTH L. REV. 357 (1974); Comment, The Ohio Guest Statute, 22 OHIO ST. L. REV.
629 (1961); Comment, Treadmill of Confusion--Ohio Guest Statute, 8 W. Rs. L. REV. 170
(1957). But cf. Comment, Rationality of Guest Statute Classifications Questioned, 53 NEB. L.
REv. 267 (1974). The great number of exceptions which courts have carved into the rule has
made recovery seem almost fortuitous. See Burrow v. Porterfield, 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d
137 (1960) (guest's knowledge which was imparted to host constituted payment for ride);
Economou v. Anderson, 4 Ohio App. 2d 1, 211 N.E.2d 82 (1965) (plaintiff injured while
entering car, not considered guest); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d
322 (1955) (plaintiff injured inside vehicle when vehicle not moving, not considered a guest).
4 Law of March 14, 1933, 115 Laws of Ohio 57 (now Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02).
Legislation to repeal the statute came before the General Assembly in 1949, 1957, 1959, and
most recently in 1974, but was never passed.
5 43 Ohio App. 2d 163, 335 N.E.2d 373 (1974).
6 Omo CoNsT. art. 1, § 2 reads:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same,
whenever they may deem it necsesary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever
be granted, that may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the General Assembly.
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tees of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution' and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution."°
Justice William B. Brown, the author of the unanimous opinion, chose
to follow neither Ohio precedent"1 nor recent cases from other jurisdictions
which have contended with the problem of the constitutionality of guest
statutes.'2 Instead, the problem was analyzed in terms of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions employing equal protection and due process
analyses to strike down a variety of statutory classifications."
The Primes court began its analysis with reference to the traditional
two-tier test for determining the constitutionality of a statutory classification
in light of equal protection guarantees. Where interests defined as
"fundamental"'" or "suspect" classifications 5 are concerned, the United States
Supreme Court has held that statutes will be strictly scrutinized to determine
if the fundamental interests sacrificed, or the suspect classifications created,
can be justified by some "compelling" state interest.'" If no compelling interest
can be found, the statute will be struck down as violative of equal protection.
However, where interests are not fundamental, nor classifications suspect,
the courts have traditionally deferred to legislative prerogative and upheld
statutes under what can be referred to as the minimal scrutiny standard.'"
9 Omo CONST. art. I § 16 reads: "All Courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law,
and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall .. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
11 Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E.2d 643 (1935) (a court of appeals opinion
holding that the statute was not violative of state or federal constitutional guarantees). See
generally cases cited note 3 supra (which assume the constitutionality of the statute and
apply it.)
12 See note 64 infra.
13 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973);
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
14 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (equal access to voting);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(right to procreate).
1
5 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry).
16 43 Ohio St. 2d at 198-99, 331 N.E.2d at 726. For an analysis of the traditional two-tier
standard of review see Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther]; Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1087-1131 (1969).
t7McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); North
[Vol. 9:3
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The Primes decision to strike the guest statute emerges, not out of this
two-tiered approach, but out of a compromise standard evolving from certain
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
8 Although the high
court has by no means cast aside two-tiered equal protection analysis," a
growing dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the old tests can be discerned."
0
The particular United States Supreme Court decisions on which the Ohio
Supreme Court has relied in Primes are consistently representative of a new
middle scrutiny analysis."'
In light of the fact that neither fundamental interests nor suspect
classifications are involved, the Primes court, under traditional analysis, was
precluded from strictly scrutinizing the statute. From a classic minimal
scrutiny standpoint the court could have concluded that there is a rational
relation between the classification and the two recognized objectives of the
legislation-the preservation of hospitality and the prevention of fraudulent
and collusive suits against insurance companies. The fraud prevention
objective could be said to be furthered by excluding the honest claims along
with the false.23 The hospitality promotion object requires a greater amount of
imagination on the part of the court to find a rational relation." Nevertheless,
it is this very type of extreme deference to any conceivable legislative objective
that has characterized the classic minimal scrutiny decisions."
Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
18 See cases cited note 13 supra.
19 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1972).
20 See Gunther, supra note 16; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L. REv.
1071 (1974); Comment, Irrebuttable Presumptions As An Alternative To Strict Scrutiny:
From Rodriquez to-LaFleur, 62 GEo. L. REv. 1173 (1974).
21 See cases cited note 13, supra; Gunther, supra note 16 at 17-20 (where both Weber and
Mosley are specifically recognized as representative of this new standard).
22 Recent decisions upholding guest statutes in other jurisdictions have done so by employing
the traditional minimal scrutiny test. Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97, 102 (Del. 1974);
Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687, 689-90 (Iowa 1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d
565, 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883, 889 (Utah 1974). All have
relied on Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929), which upheld a Connecticut guest statute
against allegations of equal protection violations. The Silver case held that the legislative
classification does not have to be perfect and that it is sufficient if the "statute strikes at
the evil where it is felt." Id. at 124. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(on which the Utah and Iowa courts also heavily relied).
23 See Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97, 103 (Del. 1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565,
572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
24 See Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883, 888 (Utah 1974). Judicial imagination was exercised
in the Utah Supreme Court's decision. The court asserted that the hospitality encouraged by
guest statutes decreases the number of vehicles on the highway thereby conserving fuel,
saving on highway surfaces, and avoiding traffic congestion.
25 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955).
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An alternative to these two extremes can be seen to lie in a scrutiny
which is somehow neither strict nor minimal yet justifies judicial intervention.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 6 and Jiminez v. Weinberger,"7 two
cases upon which the Primes court relies heavily, exemplify this middle
scrutiny and a temporary abandonment of the two-tier test. Both decisions
make reference to a standard which may be applied in all equal protection
cases.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation statute defined the word "child" in such a manner so as to
preclude compensation payments being made to illegitimate children. Under-
lying the legitimacy requirements was the state's interest in discouraging
illicit relationships and facilitating "potentially difficult problems of proof." 8
The Weber court struck down the statute, without defining illegitimacy
as a suspect classification, by applying a more rigorous test than that of
minimal scrutiny to the statutory objectives. Rather than settling for a mere
rational relationship, the court required a "significant relationship" 9 between
the legislative objectives and the statutory burdens. After heightening the
standard of scrutiny, the court found the statute violative of equal protection
guarantees.
The lack of control over a status created at birth was also a factor in
Jiminez.3° In Jiminez, the United States Supreme Court considered another
statutory classification based on illegitimacy. The court invalidated, on equal
protection grounds, a provision of the Social Security Act which denied
benefits to unacknowledged illegitimate children of disabled wage earners.21
The underlying purpose of the statutory scheme was the same in
Jiminez" and Weber" as in Primes-to prevent fraudulent and collusive
claims. In Jiminez, Chief Justice Burger determined that the potential for
spurious claims was the same as to both classes of illegitimates-acknowledged
and unacknowledged. He concluded that the "blanket and conclusive exclusion
of the one class was not reasonably related to the purpose of the statute","4
26406 U.S. 164 (1972).
27417 U.S. 628 (1974).
28 406 U.S. at 174.
2 9 Id. at 175.
30 Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974). Lack of control over status is also an
influencing factor in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Both of these decisions can be regarded as middle scrutiny equal
protection decisions.
31 417 U.S. at 630.
32 Id. at 636.
33 406 U.S. at 174.
34 417 U.S. at 636.
[Vol. 9:3
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thereby making that exclusion a denial of equal protection. Again there was
a blurring of the distinction between strict and minimal scrutiny. In both of
these decisions, the United States Supreme Court struck down the statutes
without going to the extreme of classifying the category of illegitimates as
suspect.
Greatly influenced by Jiminez,3 the Primes court was equally uncon-
vinced that there was a rational nexus between the blanket exclusion of
nonpaying passengers and the prevention of fraudulent claims. The Ohio
Supreme Court recognized that rather than preventing fraud, the Ohio guest
statute may actually be encouraging the guest to fraudulently state that he
had paid for the ride or that the host was guilty of willful and wanton
negligence. 6 Admittedly the prevention of fraud or collusion is a valid
purpose for legislative classification, 7 and perhaps the statute would have
been upheld under minimal scrutiny."8 But through the application of a more
rigorous scrutiny to the factual realities of the situation, the goal of prevention
of spurious claims was found not to be suitably furthered.
In viewing the second objective, the promotion of hospitality, the Primes
court determined that the widespread availability of liability insurance under-
cuts the credibility of the objective. The doctrine of charitable immunity
was abrogated in Ohio on the credibility of this same argument. 9 Primes
found such an approach equally convincing here. In addition to finding that
the objective is not suitably furthered, the Primes court concluded that the
promotion of hospitality of host automobile drivers or rather its correlative,
the prevention of ingratitude of passenger guests, is simply no longer a
viable objective in Ohio."6
The focus in Primes upon the amorphous requirement that the statutory
classification "suitably" further the legislative goal is derived from the
United States Supreme Court case, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely."'
Justice Marshall, the author of the court's unanimous opinion in Mosely,
advocated a singular type of scrutiny to be applied in "all equal protection
35 The Ohio court stated that the "concepts of Jiminez are transferable to the present matter."
43 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 331 N.E.2d at 727.
36 43 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 331 N.E.2d at 727.
37 Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974).
38 See cases cited note 22 supra.
39 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
40 43 Ohio St. 2d at 202, 331 N.E.2d at 728.
41408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The Mosley decision invalidated a Chicago ordinance which
prohibited all but peaceful labor picketing within 150 feet of a primary or secondary school
building. Although the court recognized that first amendment interests were involved, the
decision does not speak in terms of the traditional two-tier standard of review.
RECENT CASESWinter, 1976]
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cases." 2 He declared that the crucial question was "whether there is an
appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential
treatment"."3
While he alluded to it in Mosely, Justice Marshall fully articulates his
theory of equal protection called "variable standard of review"" or "sliding
scale""3 in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodrigues."6 There he contends that the "range of choices" which the court
is willing to allow the state in "selecting the means by which it will act" and the
care with which the court will "scrutinize the effectiveness" of the means
"must reflect the constitutional importance of the interest affected and
invidiousness of the particular classification".," Marshall's contention in
Rodriguez is that this variable standard of scrutiny, neither strict nor minimal,
is in reality the test the court has been applying in cases such as Weber."
Justice Marshall chastized the court for selecting in private 9 which cases will
be subjected to the variable test and which shall be analyzed under the
traditional test.
This criticism can be equally applied to Primes. The court by no means
rejects the traditional dual test,"0 nor does it define how or when this middle
scrutiny will be used. The result seems to be that so far as the guest statute
is concerned, the justices do not believe that the interests which are promoted
justify the burden that is imposed. As the court said, quoting from Weber,
it is a "basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing";5 the automobile
guest is neither responsible for his injury nor guilty of wrongdoing.
In Primes the Ohio Supreme Court appears to be influenced by Justice
42 408 U.S. at 95.
4 3 Id., see Gunther, supra note 16, at 17 (where Professor Gunther recognized the Mosley
decision as a basis for new equal protection standard of review).
44San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Mashall, J.,
dissenting).
45 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 125.
48 Id. at 108. Justice Marshall also cites as examples of the trend: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (statute that prohibited distribution of contraceptive devices to unmarried
persons declared unconstitutional as violative of equal protection); James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972) (state statute differentiating between criminal and non-criminal debtors declared
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state
statute giving preference to men over women in assignment of administrator of estate declared
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection).
49411 U.S. at 110.
50 43 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 331 N.E.2d at 726.
51 1d. at 199, 331 N.E.2d at 726, quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972) (The Primes court inadvertantly attributed the quote to Jiminez when in fact
the Jiminez decision was quoting Weber.)
[Vol. 9:3
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Marshall's appraisal of this third type of analysis. An individual's right to
seek a remedy at law52 for injuries negligently inflicted by another clearly
has "constitutional implications", 5 but has not yet been declared a funda-
mental right. It does not, therefore, trigger strict scrutiny. However, after
examining the state's interests, the Ohio court determined that the statute
would be examined under a more rigorous scrutiny than minimal scrutiny.
This analysis resulted in its invalidation.
Not satisfied with its equal protection analysis, the court sought to
buttress its invalidation of the guest statute by relying on the irrebuttable
presumption analysis and findings of Vlandis v. Kline. 4 Vlandis invalidated
a Connecticut statute regulating tuition rates at state universities. If a student
was not a state resident at the time of his original application to college, the
statute created a conclusive presumption that the student remained an out of
state resident. There was no provision for a hearing at a later date to determine
the student's true residency status.
Vlandis held that the statute was violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment because it made a presumption about those
included within its classificatory scheme which is not "necessarily and
universally true in fact".55 Applying this stringent test, it is not surprising
that Primes struck down the guest statute. Assuming the accuracy of the
stated legislative purposes, the Ohio law also implies an irrebuttable presump-
tion. A nonpaying passenger who sues an auto host for negligent injury is
conclusively presumed to be either committing fraud, collusion or destroying
the spirit of hospitality in Ohio.
This irrebuttable presumption analysis has re-emerged recently in
United States Supreme Court decisions.5 It has been criticized, however, for
the high level of perfection which it requires between the means a statute
employs and the ends it seeks.5 Chief Justice Burger maintains in his
Vlandis dissent that "literally thousands of state statutes" create classifications
which could be struck down under irrebuttable presumption analysis.
5 8
52 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16.
53 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
54412 U.S. 441 (1973).
55 Id. at 452.
56 Turner v. Dept. of Employment Security & Bd. of Review of the Industrial Comm. of
Utah, 96 S. Ct. 249 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United
States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
57 Comment, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HIAv. L. REv.
1534 (1974).
58 412 U.S. 441, 462 (Burger, J., dissenting).
RECETr CASESWinter, 19761
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The Primes case, however, has factors which distinguish it from this
criticism. The Ohio Constitution specifically guarantees that "all courts shall
be open" and every person shall "have remedy by due course of law" for
injuries done to his person. 9 This right of the injured person to his day in court
is arguably more basic and deserving of a higher degree of protection than
the right, recognized in Vlandis v. Kline, not to be prevented from showing
one's true state of residence for school tuition purposes. Nevertheless, the
irrebuttable presumption approach is still subject to the criticism that the
interests of a guest passenger are sufficiently well preserved under the middle
scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis.
Another major criticism of the irrebuttable presumption analysis is that
it has been alleged to represent a return to "substantive due process" reminis-
cent of the Lochner era."° The Vlandis court's choice of precedent dates
primarily from the early twentieth century6 and lends credibility to this
theory. However, a ground of difference can be seen in the fact that Primes
and Vlandis involved judicial interference on behalf of individual interests,
whereas the judicial interference justified by substantive due process was used
on behalf of business interests.62 But it is still unclear why the Ohio court
resorted to this dangerously flexible irrebuttable presumption analysis.
Since the California Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Merlo,2
several other state courts in addition to Ohio have reviewed the constitution-
ality of their guest statutes. These courts have, for the most part, analyzed
the subject in terms of the California court's constitutional rationale."4 The
5 9 OMO CONST. art. 1, § 16.
6 0 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 468 (Rehnquest, J., dissenting). The decision of Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) has become synonomous with an era of judicial intervention
during which the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was used to strike down
state regulatory laws thought to constitute an infringement upon the right to freedom of
contract. See cases cited note 61 infra.
61 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1925); Hoeper v. Comm'r., 284 U.S.
206 (1931); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
62 Id.
62 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
64 Three courts other than Ohio and California invalidated their guest statutes. See cases
cited note 2 supra. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974), explicitly based its
decision on specific wording of the North Dakota constitution as well as trends and changes
which have occurred in that state since the guest statute was enacted. While acknowledging
the existence of a "new intermediate analysis" in the United States Supreme Court's treatment
of equal protection cases, the court dismissed, as irrevelant to the situation in North Dakota,
national trends as well as the California decision. Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan.
1974), was more in line with a rigorous minimal scrutiny standard. Agreeing with Merlo,
the court held that the guest statute classification "does not bear a substantial and rational
relation to the statute's purposes." Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 53 P.2d 1365 (1974),
also arrived at a middle test, called a "restrained review test" by toning down the strict
scrutiny test. Citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as an articulation of this third test,
the Thompson court stated that it failed to find a "fair and substantial relation" between the
[Vol. 9:3
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Primes court relies on analyses and assumptions similar to those used by the
California court; 5 yet, the Ohio court explicitly states that following the
California decision would constitute a "constitutional curiosity".,6
It is true that California's tort law is widely divergent from Ohio's.
Merlo is the culmination of a progression of cases abrogating the full range
of common law intra-familial tort immunities.67 In addition, California
recently chose to abolish the determinative distinctions between invitees,
licensees, social guests and trespassers as regards the duty of care owed
by the land owner.6 Ohio, on the other hand, still recognizes all these tradi-
tional immunities" and distinctions. 0
However, none of these California decisions were made on constitutional
bases, with the exception of Merlo. It seems odd, therefore, that the Ohio
Supreme Court did not acknowledge the validity of the constitutional
arguments in Merlo, as did the Summit County Court of Appeals." Several
guest statute and the legislative objectives. For a discussion of state decisions upholding guest
statutes see note 22 supra.
65 As in Primes, the Merlo court found that neither legislative purpose was rationally
furthered by the guest statute. The widespread availability of liability insurance was recog-
nized as a factor in undermining the hospitality promotion objective. 8 Cal. 3d at 860, 506 P.2d
at 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The California court also concluded that rather than furthering
the fraud prevention objective, the guest statute improperly discriminated against guests "on
the basis of a factor" which bore no "significant relation to actual collusion." 8 Cal. 3d at
861, 506 P.2d at 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
66 43 Ohio St. 2d at 204, 331 N.E.2d at 729. The Primes court's use of this quote from
Justice Harlan's dissent in Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) is
something of a constitutional curiosity in itself. The particular statute involved precluded
parents of illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death actions against the person
responsible for the child's death. The majority held this to be a violation of equal protection.
But Justice Harlan strongly defended the Louisiana legislature's right to draw these "highly
arbitrary lines." 391 U.S. at 77.
67Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (parent-child
tort immunity); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962)
(inter-spousal tort immunity); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218, (1955)
(intra-familial tort immunity).
68 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
69 Ohio still recognizes the traditional immunities from tort liability between husband and wife
and parent and child. Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969) (inter-
spousal tort immunity); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966)
(parent-child tort immunity); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965)
(inter-spousal tort immunity); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925)
(inter-spousal tort immunity).
70 Presley v. Norwood, 36 Ohio St. 2d 29, 303 N.E.2d 81 (1973) (duty of care owed invitee);
Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951) (duty of care owed social
guest); Cole v. New York Cent. R. Co., 150 Ohio St. 175, 80 N.E.2d 854 (1948) (duty of
care owed trespasser); Potts v. David L. Smith Constr. Co., 23 Ohio App. 2d 144, 261 N.E.2d
176 (1970) (duty of care owed invitee); Brown v. Rechel, 108 Ohio App. 347, 161 N.E.2d
638 (1959) (duty of care owed licensee); Stevens v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 26 Ohio Ops. 2d
345, 193 N.E.2d 317 (C.P. Pickaway Co. 1960) (duty of care owned trespasser).
71 43 Ohio App. 2d at 167-69, 335 N.E.2d at 376-78.
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other states which still recognize these common law tort distinctions also
followed Merlo.2
CONCLUSION
The confusion that arises out of the Primes case may be due to the same
problem that other equal protection decisions seem to have been grappling
with, namely, what is to be the test? Under what circumstances does a
statutory scheme, because it is less than perfect, become invidiously discrim-
inatory? The attempts to derive a middle scrutiny analysis appear to constitute
an effort to add flexibility to the old two-tiered standard. The use of the
irrebuttable presumption analysis, however, may unnecessarily cloud the
issues. Without advancing any legal analysis, the irrebuttable presumption
approach appears to be valuable merely as a tool to allow the court to reach
a desired result where strict scrutiny cannot be applied.
MARGARET FULLER CORNEILLE
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
Separate Legal Entity Suit by Member.
Personal Injuries • Liability . Statutory Provision
Tanner v. Loyal Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St. 2d 49, 337 N.E.2d 625 (1975)
G EORGE and Marguerite Tanner, members of the Columbus Lodge No. 11
of the Loyal Order of Moose, an unincorporated association,1 were
attending a dance sponsored by that Lodge when Mrs. Tanner slipped on a
recently waxed area of the dance floor' and sustained serious injury. The
Tanners filed suit against the Lodge in the court of common pleas,3 alleging
that the dance floor had been negligently waxed, making it slippery and thus
causing her fall.
72 Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362
(Kan. 1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974).
1 An unincorporated association has been defined as an organization composed of individuals
united without a charter, pursuing some common enterprise. See Local 4076, United Steel-
workers v. United Steelworkers AFL-CIO, 327 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
2 Depositions of the plaintiffs filed with the trial court indicated that shortly before Mrs.
Tanner fell, an officer of the lodge had waxed the floor with a powdered wax which left
the floor slippery in spots, including the place where Mrs. Tanner fell.
3 Tanner v. Columbus Lodge No. 11, Loyal Order of Moose, Docket No. 72 CV-05-1557
(C. P. Franklin County, April 23, 1974),
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